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BOOK REVIEW
Making Jury Instructions Understandable. Amiram Elwork,*
Bruce D. Sales,** and James J. Alfini.*** Contemporary Litigation Series, The Michie Company, 1982, Pp. 390, $35.00.
Reviewed by Mark M. Dobson****

In the course of its function, there is both war and peace, joy and sadness,
affection and hatred, rational and irrationalbehavior. There is tolerance and
bigotry. Religion, race, color, and education all become issues at one time or
another. The jury is a living, breathing, changing animal.'

The jury occupies a special part in our system of justice. Juries
have traditionally been considered a major protection against oppressive judges or unjust prosecutions. The right to jury trial in
certain criminal' and civil3 cases is constitutionally guaranteed.
The Founding Fathers considered these guarantees important
bulwarks against the king's tyranny they wished to escape. To
ensure this, juries must have the opportunity of representing a
fair cross section of the community.'

* Hahnemann University, Philadelphia; formerly at University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
** University of Arizona, Tuscon; formerly at University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
*** American Judicature Society

**** J.D. 1973, Catholic University; LL.M. 1977, Temple University; Associate Professor
of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.
1. Goldberg, The Trials of a Juror, THE PENNSYLVANIA GAZETTE, April 1981, at 19.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

This right has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's Due Process
Clause. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). However, the right only applies to serious
crimes, not petty offenses. Id. at 158.
3. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Unlike the sixth amendment right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, the seventh
amendment right to jury trials for civil cases has not been extended to the states. See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937).
4. "[T]he American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross
section of the community." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975). Taylor held that a
jury selection system automatically excluding women from jury service unless they file a written
declaration of their desire to serve violates the sixth amendment. However, there is no requirement that different community segments actually be represented on a particular jury. Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972).
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Yet the American jury system has recently come under much
criticism often aimed at the expense and delays of jury trials. Efforts to reduce the size of juries have increased. 5 In addition, judges
have called for decreasing attorney participation in jury selection.'
However, the most serious criticism is that juries are sometimes
incapable of functioning effectively, because jurors cannot understand either the factual presentation of a case or the law involved. 7
Although jurors were once finders of both law and fact, they
now receive instruction on the law from judges and are trusted
only with deciding facts.' To function effectively, the American
jury system assumes that juries can and do understand the law
in a judge's instructions. Although there are isolated instances
where the United States Supreme Court has declared certain jury
instructions incapable of being followed because of a case's
unique characteristics,' the Court assumes jurors follow the law. °
5. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), held that the sixth amendment does not constitutionally require a twelve person jury. However, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978),
found that the sixth amendment forbids a jury composed of less than six members.
Twelve person juries are not constitutionally required to reach unanimous verdicts in noncapital criminal cases. E.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding Oregon constitutional provision allowing guilty verdicts based on agreement of ten members of a twelve person jury). However, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), declared non-unanimous guilty
verdicts by six person juries unconstitutional. Federal criminal trials require unanimous verdicts.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a).
6. For conflicting views on how much involvement attorneys should have in questioning
prospective jurors, compare Frates and Greer, Jury Voir Dire: The Lawyer's Perspective, 2 LITIGATION, Winter 1976, at 17 (voir dire should be conducted by attorneys) with Atkins, Jury Voir
Dire: The Judge's Perspective, 2 LITIGATION, Winter 1976, at 19 (voir dire should be conducted
by the court).
7. An exception to the seventh amendment right to civil jury trial when the case presents
unusually complex factual or legal questions has been urged. Courts and commentators have split
on this issue. See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (demand
for jury trial stricken because the size of the class action and complex relationships between numerous
parties made it beyond "the ability and competence of any jury to understand and decide with
rationality"); In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d
Cir. 1980) (fifth amendment due process clause requires striking jury demand; inability to understand
the law undermines traditional jury role as "verdicts will be erratic and completely unpredictable,
which would be inconsistent with evenhanded justice"); Comment, Non-Jury Trialof Civil Litigation:
Justifying a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 15 RICH. L. REv. 897 (1981) (arguing
that in exceptional cases, a jury trial can be denied without violating the seventh amendment).
But see In re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to recognize
a complexity exception to the seventh amendment and adopting an historical test to decide whether
an issue is legal rather than equitable, thus requiring a jury trial); Radial Lip Machine Inc. v.
International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. 111.1977) (refusing to recognize a complexity
exception to the seventh amendment). See generally Note, A Due Process Limitation on the Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trialin Complex Civil Litigation, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. Rav. 547 (1981)
(summarizing the arguments for and against jury trials in complex civil cases).
8. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1894) (rejecting the argument that jurors can
determine the law for themselves in a criminal case and thus should be instructed on lesser included offenses even where there was no evidence to support them).
9. For example, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), reversed a conviction when
at a joint trial a non-testifying co-defendant's confession also incriminating Bruton was introduced, although the jury was instructed to disregard it in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence.
Since the co-defendant did not testify and could not be cross-examined, this violated Bruton's
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When a jury does not understand the law given it, jurors are expected to request clarification or supplemental instructions. After
jurors have been individually polled on whether a verdict
represents their decision, they have long been forbidden to later
impeach it by claiming the instructions were misunderstood."
Despite these assumptions, there is a growing belief that many
jurors do not understand instructions although they remain silent
about their individual or collective ignorance." When jurors do
fail to understand the instructions, our judicial system fails, since
one of its basic premises is negated.
Making Jury Instructions Understandableis the product of
several years' detailed research by two social scientists, one with
a law degree, and a lawyer to demonstrate and remedy this problem. In essence, this book is both an advocate's guide and a practice manual. The first three chapters contain the advocacy guide
and begin by supplying authoritative sources and arguments for
sixth amendment right to confrontation, despite the instruction, because "there are some contexts
in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored." Id. at 135. See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (New
York procedure leaving the determintion of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury violated
fourteenth amendment due process since the court, despite instruction to the jury, cannot be certain the jury resolved the issue of voluntariness before considering the confession's reliability).
10. "A crucial assumption . . . is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the
trial judge. Were this not so, it would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even
more pointless for an appellate court to reverse . . . because the jury was improperly instructed."
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (holding that when a defendant's confession "interlocks" with the non-testifying co-defendant's confession, the Confrontation Clause does not
require reversal if the jury was instructed that each confession could only be used against the
person making it). See generally Haddad, Post- Bruton Developments: A Reconsiderationof The
ConfrontationRationale, and a Proposalfor a Due ProcessEvaluation of Limiting Instructions,
18 AMER. CR. L. REv. 1 (1980) for a discussion of interlocking confession problems and solutions.
11. FED. R. EvID. 606(b) states in part:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind
or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning
his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may tesitfy on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
This forbids any claim that jurors misunderstood instructions or voted incorrectly. See United
States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp 972 (W.D. Pa. 1976), affd 545 F.2d 864 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977), where two jurors claimed they did not understand the effect of
their answers when polled and claimed they did not hear that a verdict must be unanimous. "As
far as the jurors understanding the court's instructions, the court's instructions were clear." Id.
at 978; United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1979) "The possibility that the jury
misunderstood or even intentionally misapplied the law . . . does not warrant reversal of the conviction. . . . There is no claim that the court erred in giving the law to the jury as it did." Id.
at 1003. See generally Carlson and Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigmsfor Rule Revision, 1977 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 247, for a discussion of the rational forbidding impeachment of jury
verdicts, exceptions thereto, and proposed changes in FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
12. One troubling study cited by the authors showed that, after having been read the Florida
Standard Jury Instructions relative thereto, only fifty percent of the Florida jurors studied understood
a criminal defendant did not have to present evidence of innocence. See Strawn and Buchannan,
Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976).
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the interested practitioner to use in convincing judges and jury
instruction committees how often and why misunderstanding of
instructions occurs. The authors then briefly outline their own
research, which underlies what may be characterized as the book's
major theme, i.e., that the problem not only exists but also that
theirs is the most realistic approach to remedy it.
Jury misunderstanding is attributed to several major flaws.
The authors first claim that while pattern instructions have
eliminated the problem trial judges face in accurately phrasing
instructions to avoid appellate reversal, this is all such instructions have accomplished. Legal experts developed pattern instructions with an eye to assuring legal accuracy, and the authors contend that "relatively little attention has been given to insuring that
they are understandable and easy for jurors to use."13 One experiment demonstrates the minimal effect pattern instructions may actually have on a jury's comprehension. The authors tested one set
of standard instructions in which the crucial element was contributory negligence. Results showed that incorrect verdicts' were
reached forty percent of the time where no instructions at all were
given, yet pattern instructions still produced incorrect verdicts
thirty-nine percent of the time." The supposedly legally correct
instructions amounted to little better than no improvement.
Besides insufficient attention to instructions' comprehensibility, the book also criticizes how instructions are customarily
presented to a jury. At a trial's beginning, jurors are traditionally
given rather perfunctory instructions, if any, on their role, with
substantive instructions on the law waiting until the trial's conclusions. The authors argue that jurors, despite being instructed
not to consider the merits of the case until its conclustion, have
a preconceived result in mind before they receive substantive law
instructions. Therefore, jurors are unlikely to passively receive
evidence during the trial. This increases the chances of a lawless
verdict as jurors "select and evaluate evidence in terms of their
own sense of morality and justice"'" as the trial progresses. Once
13. A. Elwork, B. Sales and J. Alfini, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE §

1-2, at 9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE]. For another
criticism of pattern instructions see Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies,
69 CAtUF. L. Rav. 731, 737-740 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Communicating with Juries]. "[D]espite
their convenience as a startingpoint, they are for the most part a poor vehiclefor communicating

with jurors." Id. at 739.
14. This occurred "whenever a juror failed to correctly apply the law to his/her own beliefs
of the facts of the case." MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 1-3, at 13.
15. Id. at 14.
16. Id. § 1-4(B), at 23. A recent article describing a new method of jury research supports
this conclusion. See Vinson, The Shadow Jury: An Experiment in Litigation Science, 68 A.B.A.

19821

BOOK REVIEW

a juror has formed a conclusion as to the evidence, the decision
may be irreversible regardless of what law is later presented. Thus
the authors recommended that substantive instructions be given
both at the beginning and the end of trials.17 The authors also
criticize the practice of not allowing jurors to have written copies
of instructions to both read while the judge instructs them and
keep for later reference. Admitting that there are no legal studies
assessing the effect of such, the authors argue that studies in educational and cognitive psychology support their conclusion that
allowing written instructions would improve comprehension." s
However instructive the authors' work may be, the most
remarkable aspect of their discussion on how instructions are given
is its brevity. Unfortunately, they apparently have seen fit to ignore or disregard other innovative methods of instruction without
explaining why they do so. For example, there is no consideration on how giving juries audio-taped instructions to take into the
jury deliberation room might affect comprehension." Likewise,
there is no discussion about whether final instructions should be
given to the jury before or after closing arguments.2 ° Since the
authors feel the current method of presenting instructions is one
of two basic causes for misunderstanding, more attention to this
subject would have been appropriate."
J. 1243 (1982). '[M]any jurors come to a decision very early in the trial and then seek support
for their conclusion. "Id. at 1244.
17. The authors are not alone in this suggestion. See Prettyman, Jury Instructions-Firstor
Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1960). Unfortunately, the authors do not supply an example of what
these preliminary instructions on both substantive law and the jury's role should contain. For a
brief sample by one writer agreeing with the author's suggestion see Communicating with Juries,
supra note 13, at 760-62.
18. The authors also make strong practical arguments for doing so:
Having the judge read the jury instructions first assures that each juror pays attention to
them at least once. Giving . . . a chance to make written notes of [unclear sections] increases the chances that they will return to them. Giving [a copy to keep] increases the
probability that they will . . . remember the instructions and allows easy access to them
anytime clarification is needed.
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 1-4(A), at 20.
Unfortunately most courts discourage allowing jurors to retain written copies for fear they
will single out certain instructions. See United States v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (5th. Cir. 1977).
"[T]he practice is conducive to dissection of the charge by the jury and overemphasis of isolated
parts rather than consideration of the charge as a whole." Id. at 526.
19. See United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982) refusing to reverse on
the grounds that tape recorded instructions were provided to the jurors since the jurors were adequately informed to consider the charges as a whole.
20. In federal criminal trials, instructions are given after closing argument. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 30. In at least one state, instructions are given before closing argument. See KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-251(a) (1976).
21. Communicating with Juries, supra note 13, at 747-755, suggests limiting the number
of instructions, a point the authors do not discuss.
There are more recent indications, partly attributable to the authors' work, that judges are
considering innovative methods of increasing the jury's role. See Judges Push IncreasedJury Role,
Natl. L.J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 1, Col. 5.
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After briefly discussing these two central problems with jury
instructions, insufficient attention to the instructions' comprehensibility and the problems with the method of presentation, the advocacy section argues that the authors' approach to the problem
is the best available. Simply rewriting instructions is not enough,
since this still will not insure that instructions will achieve "sufficient comprehensibility," 22 a concept crucial to understanding the
authors' work. Improved instructions are not enough unless they
reach a satisfactory minimum level of comprehension that the legal
community can live with. The authors end their advocacy part
by describing how they analyzed two sets of instructions, one simple and one complex, in an attempt to reach this level. " After
one rewrite, jurors receiving the simple instructions correctly
answered eighty percent of the questions asked about the instructions. The same level was reached with two rewrites of the complex set.2 ' This would seem logical, as the initially more complex set contains more potential for error and thus needs more
work. However, since the complex set was not patterned but the
simple set was, does this mean that pattern instructions as a whole
are likely to be more comprehensible to begin with? Since only
one set of each was analyzed, unfortunately, no firm conclusions
can be drawn. What can be concluded from the authors' experience
in analyzing and rewriting instructions is that the process is not
nearly as simple as their book describes. The authors admit they
ran out of money before reaching their desired "sufficient comprehensibility" level, yet profess their belief that one more rewrite would be enough. Unfortunately this seems to undercut their
later arguments on how long any rewriting effort will take. If the
designers of the process were wrong in estimating the time and
money required, how likely are novices to be any more successful?
The practice manual aspect of Making Jury Instructions
Understandableconsists of the remaining four chapters and several
appendices. The authors' methodology is designed around a
fourstep approach: (1) initial testing, (2) evaluation of test results,
22. The authors admit that no rewriting procedure can define what is a sufficient level of
understanding. While believing an ideal level of comprehension exists when evaluators can be
ninety percent (90%) certain two-thirds of a jury's members understand each point of law, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE, § 2-3(A) at 38, the authors admit that "[i]n the final
analysis, however, the definition of what is or is not sufficiently comprehensible [will] have to
depend on the judgments of the legal community of each jurisdiction adopting our procedures."
Id. at 36.
23. The complex instructions, from a Nevada attempted murder trial, involved several lesser
included offenses and an insanity defense. The simple instructions were from a mock burglary
trial using FLORIDA JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (1975).
24. MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 3-2, at 45-46.
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(3) rewriting of instructions and (4) testing of the rewritten instructions. However, the authors carefully point out that not all
the steps must be used by every person concerned about a set of
instructions. Bar association committees should be interested in
all, but lawyers concerned with only making a record against certain instructions could stop after evaluating the results of initial
testing. To describe the authors' complete rewriting process would
needlessly duplicate their already detailed work. From a chapter
devoted to telling how to begin the initial organization process
in forming a rewriting team to a final section on concerns in redrafting, the reader is led step-by-step through the entire process.
Instructions on how to read and evaluate several computer printouts, as well as sample printouts, are included to guide readers
unfamiliar with social science work.
Unfortunately, as detailed as the description is, several serious
questions remain unanswered. In addition, a major mistake in the
testing process is made. After describing how evaluative questions should be written for each particular instruction's initial
testing, the authors describe how juror questionnaires should be
administered. In so doing, they recommend giving each juror adequate time to study the instructions after a tester has read them.
However, this is not the way instructions are usually administered
in court. Even when jurors are given instructions to read along
with the judge, the instructions are usually collected immediately
afterwards. Thus by allowing volunteer jurors to study instructions longer than real jurors can, the authors distort the testing
process. This may, in turn, distort their initial comprehensibility
assessment's results. Jurors tested under the authors' format are
likely to achieve a higher level of comprehension than would jurors
who do not have time to study instructions. Since the same questionnaire administration process is again used to evaluate whether
rewritten instructions have achieved "sufficient comprehensibility," a second warping of results is possible. Their mistake,
although a serious one, is easily explainable. The authors apparently believe their recommendations of allowing jurors to have written
instructions to read and keep for reference will be followed. Thus
they have formulated their test administration procedures based
on such. This demonstrates the possible need to deviate from the
authors' particular recommendation on how questionnaires should
be administered and adopt the approach to the procedures a particular jurisdiction actually uses in instructing juries. If juries cannot study instructions after the judge reads them, the testing pro-
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cess should eliminate this or judges should be persuaded to change
their instruction procedure as the authors suggest.
Besides this error, Making Jury Instructions Understandable
is troubling for several questions it fails to address. Computer
results of any evaluation not only indicate how many jurors understand a particular initial or rewritten question but also show
whether the sample of volunteer jurors utilized is representative
of actual panels in a particular jurisdiction. However, the authors
give no indication of what should be done when an unrepresentative set of sample jurors achieves "sufficient comprehensibility" on a set of rewritten instructions. Should testing continue until both realistic representation and sufficient comprehensibility
is achieved? Or is sufficient comprehensibility alone enough?
Finally, the authors fail to adequately address the question
of cost. They calculate that rewriting a fifty page set of complex
instructions will take a recommended team25 three to four months
of part-time work. Since any bar association committee considering
adopting the authors' method will be concerned with cost in terms
of dollars as well as time, the failure to supply any monetary
estimate will retard the method from being utilized.26 More importantly, cost in terms of the time involved does not stop once
a set of instructions reaches "sufficient comprehensibility."
Especially in jurisdictions having no required set of pattern instructions, and even in those that do, appeals based on the legal
accuracy of the new instructions should be expected. Thus, until
approved by a jurisdiction's highest court, any new instructions
will create uncertainty and costs related thereto.
Even with the omissions noted, the authors' approach deserves
careful consideration. No one can seriously dispute the problem
of "legalese" in modern instructions. However, the question is
whether the authors' complete suggested methodology or a less
radical approach, such as using only their grammatical drafting
suggestions, should be adopted. The authors hope their method
will be initially appealing to jury instructions committees but admit this is unlikely. They believe such committees will ultimately be forced into adopting their suggestions by lawyers who successfully use the suggested techniques to win appellate reversals.
Whether this is realistic remains to be seen. How many firms or
25. See MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 5-1 for a description of each team
member's role.
26. The authors apparently secured several grants to develop and test their methodology.
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDESTANDABLE at xi. Interested individuals or committees may
possibly obtain some cost estimate by contacting them directly.
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lawyers have the time, money and capability of utilizing the procedures described is questionable, especially since some access
to computers is necessary. Lawyers may find the time involved
in using the method to create an appellate record the hardest problem to master. As a matter of trial procedure, all objections to
instructions must be made before the jury retires.27 Thus, in order
to use the authors' suggested methodology, lawyers must anticipate
months in advance what the exact wording of the instructions will
be and which instructions will be given. This will not be possible
in all jurisdictions, especially where pattern instructions are not
utilized.
Even if the full testing technique and rewriting procedure
presented in Making Jury Instructions Understandableis never
adopted, the book is well worth reading; although at thirty-five
dollars per copy it seems definitely over-priced. Some of the empirical data generated by the authors' research is of immense practical value to the trial bar. For example, the authors' research confirms that better educated jurors are more likely to understand
instructions and that beyond a certain age the ability of jurors to
comprehend instructions substantially decreases.28 As the research
also reveals that the less comprehensible instructions are, the more
likely verdicts are to favor plaintiffs, their results should be of
some assistance to counsel in deciding which jurors to peremptorily challenge. Likewise, the outlined grammatical principles
for rewriting should especially help lawyers in nonpattern instructions states to improve comprehension of instructions.
However, even given these benefits, whether Making Jury
Instructions Understandable'sprocedures and ideas will ever be
fully adopted is debatable. The authors envision a national reform
project, possibly along the lines of the American Law Institute's
work on model codes, which will serve as a clearinghouse for
reform of jury instructions. Since some instructions could be
developed for use nationwide, this would alleviate duplication of
work problems. One possibility the authors surprisingly neglect
considering is reforming the organization of bar committees which
presently oversee pattern instruction drafting. Each state could
establish a permanent instruction research team to complete the
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
28. This poses the critical question whether there should be a maximum age and minimum
education requirement for jury service. The authors chose not to address this, being content to
merely state their research results: "[S]ome jurors were truly less than minimally competent and
simply incapable of understanding certain key points of law regardless of how well they were
explained. For example, as a group, jurors who were very old and relatively uneducated ..
(emphasis added). MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE § 3-4(A), at 63.
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testing, evaluation and redrafting process. The bar committees
could discuss the research team's work and decide on accepting
the final product. However, such massive, coordinated efforts are
probably at least several years away. Considering the initial
logistical problems involved in any detailed rewriting effort the
authors recommend, advocates of the authors' approach will probably have to be satisfied with using it to begin dispelling the skepticism lawyers and bar associations have towards drastic procedural changes29 and wait for others to accomplish the task of
making jury instructions truly understandable.

29. The attempt to reform the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an excellent
recent example. After several years of research and debate, the new rules were only recently
approved by the American Bar -Association House of Delegates.

